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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Trustees are not liable for breach of trust to a sui juris and fully informed beneficiary who has 
consented to the breach.1 Moreover, such a beneficiary may have his interest impounded to 
indemnify the trustees against any liability which they incur to other beneficiaries who have 
not consented to the breach.2 For the purposes of these rules, the beneficiary’s ‘consent’ can 
take various forms, including instigation, concurrence, acquiescence, adoption, confirmation 
and release, and the rules shielding trustees from liability may work differently according to 
the type of ‘consent’ which the beneficiary has given.3 Many cases, such as the instigation 
                                                     
1 Walker v Symonds (1818) 3 Swan 1; 36 ER 751; Stafford v Stafford (1857) 1 De G&J 193; 44 ER 697; Evans v 
Benyon (1887) 37 Ch D 329; Re Jarvis [1958] 1 WLR 815; Re Pauling’s ST (No 1) [1964] Ch 303; Pullan v 
Wilson [2014] EWHC 126 (Ch); [2014] WTLR 669. 
2 Trustee Act 1925, s 62; Re Pauling’s ST (No 2) [1963] Ch 576; Brudenell-Bruce v Moore [2014] EWHC 3679 
(Ch); [2015] WTLR 373 [250]. Relief under s 62 can only be granted after a finding that a breach of trust has 
been committed, and so relief cannot be granted for contemplated future acts: Mitchell v Halliwell [2005] 
EWHC 937 (Ch) [64]. 
3 J Payne, ‘Consent’ in P Birks and A Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002) 301: 
‘“consent” to breach of trust is not a single, simple concept to which a single, simple set of rules can necessarily 
be applied in order to determine whether the beneficiary should be allowed to sue the trustee’. 
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and concurrence cases, can be explained as an application of estoppel doctrine, but some, 
such as the acquiescence cases, do not lend themselves so readily to this analysis.4 
This chapter concerns one group of cases which are governed by these rules, namely 
cases where the trustees perform acts which are unauthorised by the trust deed with the 
unanimous consent of the beneficiaries who are all sui juris and fully informed and 
collectively the owners of the entire beneficial interest.5 Nowadays these conditions are not 
often satisfied because many trusts are drafted as discretionary settlements with wide classes 
of beneficiaries, including contingent beneficiaries such as future children in the case of 
family trusts and future spouses and dependents in the case of pension trusts.6 However, 
trusts with fewer beneficiaries, all of whom had vested interests, were once much more 
common. Furthermore, trustees’ investment powers and powers of delegation were once 
much more limited than they are today. Hence it often happened in the nineteenth century 
that trustees deliberately acted beyond the scope of their authority ‘at the instigation of the 
beneficiaries’ and that such breaches were ‘the result of considered agreement’ between 
trustees and beneficiaries who were sui juris and the owners of the whole beneficial interest.7 
In cases of this kind, as in the more general run of cases, the trustees are not liable for 
their breaches of trust to the consenting beneficiaries. Unlike the more general run of cases, 
                                                     
4 For further discussion, see Spellson v George (1992) 26 NSWLR 666 and Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; 
(2011) 243 CLR 253, critiqued in T Economou, ‘The Defence of Acquiescence to a Breach of Trust’ (2013) 15 
Flinders LJ 115. See also Lusina Ho’s chapter in the present volume. 
5 In other words, we do not discuss cases where trustees commit a breach of duty other than a duty to comply 
with the terms of the trust instrument, nor do we discuss cases where not all of the beneficiaries are sui juris and 
fully informed and in agreement. 
6 But see Re Barton (Deceased) [2002] EWHC 264 (Ch); [2002] WTLR 469; Hughes v Bourne [2012] EWHC 
2232 (Ch); [2012] WTLR 1333. 
7 C Stebbings, The Private Trustee in Victorian England (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) 96. 
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however, our cases also possess the unusual feature that the trustees’ unauthorised actions, 
when performed with the beneficiaries’ consent, take effect as though they were authorised. 
This is noticed in the main practitioner works on trusts law. Lewin on Trusts, for example, 
contains a discussion of the rules shielding trustees from liability to consenting beneficiaries 
in Chapter 39, under the heading ‘Defence of Concurrence, Acquiescence or Release and 
Confirmation by a Beneficiary’; but the cases with which we are concerned then reappear in 
Chapter 45, on ‘Lawful Departure from the Trusts’, under the heading ‘By Agreement’.8 
This suggests that while estoppel reasoning (or some close variant of it) can be used 
to explain the trustees’ escape from liability in all the ‘consent’ cases, a different explanation 
can also be given for our cases that does not work for the others. This is that the trustees’ 
duties are changed as a result of the beneficiaries’ consenting to their unauthorised actions, 
with the result that the trustees commit no breach of duty although they act in a way that is 
not permitted by the trust deed. This point was made by Master Matthews in Pettigrew v 
Edwards, where he said that in cases where beneficiaries all give their informed consent to a 
course of action taken by the trustees:9 
 
I do not think it is necessary to resort to any kind of estoppel. The beneficiaries have 
given their (fully informed) consent to the action. They have licensed the trustees to 
do what might otherwise be a wrong. So it is not a breach of trust and they cannot 
complain of it as such thereafter. 
 
                                                     
8 L Tucker, N Le Poidevin and J Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts 19th edn (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) 
[39.106]–[39.126], [45.03]–[45.04]. See too D Hayton, P Matthews and C Mitchell, Underhill & Hayton: Law 
Relating to Trusts and Trustees 19th edn (London, LexisNexis, 2016) [43.12], [95.1]–[ 95.24]. 
9 [2017] EWHC 8 (Ch) [46]. 
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This is interesting from a theoretical point of view because it tells us something about 
the ways in which new rights and duties can be created under existing trusts. It also has 
practical consequences, not because it affects the outcome of claims by the beneficiaries 
against the trustees (since the beneficiaries will lose either way), but because it affects the 
position of third parties with whom the trustees have dealt and the content of the 
beneficiaries’ rights and the trustees’ duties going forward. As James Penner has written, the 
‘substance’ of a trust subsists for as long as there are trustee duties, and their character 
determines the nature of the trust whether or not the trustee incurs any liability for breaching 
them; furthermore, ‘dealings with trust property in compliance with the terms of the trust are 
the justification in law for those transactions being valid for the parties involved’.10 
It follows that the rules laid down in our cases merit consideration for two different 
reasons: first, because they can be understood to shield the trustees from liability for breach 
of trust in an unusual way, and, secondly, because they enable the trustees and beneficiaries 
to create new rights and duties under the trust. To analyse the first of these effects, one could 
adopt the method used by James Goudkamp in his study of tort defences, and ask whether the 
rule shielding the trustees from liability is a ‘denial’ that all the elements of a claim are 
present or a ‘defence’ which concedes that these elements are present but identifies another 
reason why there is no liability.11 One would then have to identify the elements of the 
beneficiaries’ claim where the trustees have done an unauthorised act, and discuss what 
difference it makes whether trustees owe a duty to hold and produce the trust property in an 
authorised form when called on to do so, exigible through an order for specific performance 
                                                     
10 J Penner, ‘Exemptions’ in Birks and Pretto (n 3) 252. 
11 J Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). See too J Goudkamp and C Mitchell, 
‘Denials and Defences in the Law of Unjust Enrichment’ in C Mitchell and W Swadling (eds), The Restatement 
Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: Critical and Comparative Essays (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). 
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or an order for substitutive performance by money payment, or owe a duty not to dispose of 
the property in an unauthorised way, breach of which triggers a secondary duty to pay 
compensation.12  
Whichever of these explanations of the trustees’ liability is correct, it seems most 
likely that in our cases (but not in the more general run of cases) the beneficiaries’ consent 
would enable the trustees not to invoke a ‘defence’ but rather to deny that they owed the 
relevant duty in the first place. Interesting as it would be to work through the details of this 
argument, however, our purpose in this chapter is to discuss the second effect, and to 
consider the rules which produce it alongside other rules which determine when settlors, 
trustees, beneficiaries and other parties can validly create new rights and duties under 
existing trusts. We examine these other rules in Sections 2–4, before returning to our rules in 
Sections 5–6.  
 
2. EXERCISE OF POWERS CONFERRED BY THE SETTLOR 
 
We start by observing that when an express trust is first created the settlor may reserve 
powers to himself, or grant powers to others, the exercise of which at some later date will 
create new rights and duties under the trust. Modern settlors often seek to achieve flexibility 
accompanied by ongoing control over the exercise of dispositive and administrative 
discretions by the trustees. The devices used by trust drafters to achieve these objectives 
                                                     
12 Following Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns (a firm) [1996] AC 421 and AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & 
Co (a firm) [2014] UKSC 58; [2015] AC 1503, most cases on trustee liability to reconstitute improperly 
depleted trust funds must still be analysed as though the first formulation were correct, but some cases must now 
be analysed as though the second formulation were correct, namely cases where the trust has been exhausted 
and the trust fund has become absolutely vested in possession and/or where money has been paid out of a bare 
trust arising as an incident of a wider commercial transaction: Underhill (n 8) [87.31]–[87.42]. 
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include vesting wide powers in the settlor, trustees, beneficiaries, and/or other parties such as 
protectors. Examples are powers to revoke the trust, amend the trust instrument,13 change the 
governing law of the trust, appoint or resettle trust property, buy or sell trust property, add or 
remove beneficiaries, appoint or remove trustees, and so on.14 One can also have a power of 
veto over the exercise of a power by another power-holder, so that, for example, the trustees 
can only exercise powers of sale and investment or a power of appointment with the consent 
of the settlor or beneficiaries.15  
Where the valid exercise of a power depends on another person’s consent, a purported 
exercise of the power is void if the consent is not given. If the trust deed permits consent to 
be given retrospectively this problem may be cured by subsequent ratification.16 Otherwise it 
cannot be,17 and if trustees bring transactions into the trust account which are unauthorised 
for this reason, the account can be falsified and the trustees can be subjected to a personal 
                                                     
13 Much litigated in the pensions context: D Pollard, The Law of Pensions Trusts (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2013) ch 17. 
14 M Hubbard, Protectors of Trusts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) ch 6; J Kessler, Drafting Trusts 
and Will Trusts: A Modern Approach, 12th edn (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) ch 12; Underhill (n 8) ch 
14. 
15 G Thomas, Thomas on Powers, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) paras 7.107–7.128; 
Hubbard (n 14) paras 6.126–6.146; Kessler (n 14) paras 7.21, 7.23–7.24. Legislation also provides in some 
cases that the consent of beneficiaries is needed before trustees can exercise a statutory power: eg the Trustee 
Act 1925, s 32(1)(c) requires the trustees to obtain the life tenant’s consent to the exercise of their statutory 
power of advancement. 
16 Offen v Harman (1859) 29 LJ Ch 307. 
17 Bateman v Davis (1818) 3 Madd 98; 56 ER 446; Greenham v Gibbeson (1834) 10 Bing 363, 374–75; 131 ER 
944, 949; Gilbey v Rush [1906] 1 Ch 11, 22–23; Whitmore-Searle v Whitmore-Searle [1907] 2 Ch 332; Re 
Courage Group’s Pension Schemes [1987] 1 WLR 495, 504–07. 
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liability to make up the shortfall.18 Where the person upon whose consent the valid exercise 
of a power is predicated cannot give his consent it may be that the power can never be 
exercised; but although the court has no general power to dispense with consents required by 
a trust deed or statute,19 it may do so where this is permitted by statute,20 or even in 
exceptional cases when acting under its inherent jurisdiction – as it might do, for example, 
where the person whose consent is required cannot give it owing to a disability.21 The 
decision whether to exercise a power of veto may also be taken by the court in the place of a 
fiduciary power-holder who is prevented from exercising the power by an inescapable 
conflict of interest.22 
 The creation of new rights and duties under a trust by the exercise of a power is not 
only sourced in the power-holder’s intention to produce this effect: it is also sourced in the 
settlor’s intention that the power-holder should be able to do this. Like the rules which 
determine whether a settlor has intended to create rights and duties under an express trust,23 
the rules which determine whether a settlor has intended to create powers require this 
question to be tested objectively: the question is whether a reasonable person would consider 
this to be the meaning of the settlor’s words, or to follow from the settlor’s words by 
                                                     
18 Cocker v Quayle (1830) 1 Russ & M 535, 538; 39 ER 206, 207; Re Massingberd’s Settlement (1890) 63 LT 
296. However, a beneficiary cannot ask for the accounts to be falsified if he knowingly acquiesced in the 
trustee’s unauthorised act: Stevenson v Robinson (1868) 37 LJ Ch 499. 
19 Re Forster’s Settlement [1942] Ch 199. 
20 Eg, Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, s 14, considered in Bagum v Hafiz [2015] EWCA 
Civ 801; [2016] Ch 241. 
21 Re Cardross’s Settlement (1878) 7 Ch D 728; Re Cooper (1884) 27 Ch D 565; Saipem SpA v Rafidain Bank 
[1994] CLC 253, further proceedings [2007] EWHC 3119 (Ch). 
22 Scully v Coley [2009] UKPC 29 [47]–[49], noting Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587. 
23 Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26, (2011) 243 CLR 253. 
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necessary inference.24 To decide whether a power has been created by a trust deed, and if so, 
what are the conditions for its exercise, its content and duration, etc, the court is therefore 
thrown upon ‘the ordinary canons of construction; the instrument will need to be construed as 
a whole against the factual matrix from which it emerged’.25 
 Powers may not be forced onto the intended donees of powers who do not want them. 
Thus, the Law of Property Act 1925, s 156(1) provides that: 
 
A person to whom any power, whether coupled with an interest or not, is given may 
by deed disclaim the power, and, after disclaimer, shall not be capable of exercising 
or joining in the exercise of the power. 
 
If a settlor purports to confer a power on several people whom he intends to be the trustees of 
a settlement, and one disclaims the office while the others accept it, the power never vests in 
the ‘disclaiming trustee’, but as a general rule the power vests in the others who may then 
exercise it.26 However, if a settlor intends that rights and duties under an express trust should 
                                                     
24 Re Pope’s Contract [1911] 2 Ch 442: a power to vary trust investments and so a power to sell these can be 
implied from a power to invest. Cf Re Evans’s Settlement [1967] 1 WLR 1294: a power vested in trustees to 
advance out of the trust fund a sum ‘not exceeding £5,000’ necessarily excluded a simultaneous exercise of the 
trustees’ power of advancement under the Trustee Act 1925, s 32. 
25 Howell v Lees-Millais [2009] EWHC 1754 (Ch); [2009] WTLR 1163 [8]. See also National Grid Co plc 
Mayes [2001] UKHL 20, [2001] 1 WLR 864 [16]–[63]. Earlier times: Bishop of Oxford v Leighton (1700) 2 
Vern 376, 377; 23 ER 837, 838: ‘although the proviso be unskilfully penned, it amounts unto a power of 
revoking, and limiting new uses’; Thornton v Hawley (1804) 10 Ves Jun 129, 137; 32 ER 793, 796: words 
annexed to a clause empowering trustees of marriage settlement to purchase land ‘after request’ from a married 
couple ‘tend strongly to shew, the meaning could not be, that request should be a condition precedent’. 
26 Adams v Taunton (1820) 5 Madd 435; 56 ER 961; Sands v Nugee (1836) 8 Sim 130; 59 ER 52; Earl Granville 
v M’Neile (1849) 7 Hare 156; 68 ER 64; Crawford v Forshaw [1891] 2 Ch 261. 
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arise only if a power is exercised by a particular person, then these rights and duties may 
never come into existence if that person is unable to act or declines to do so. 
 The question whether a power-holder may exercise the power in a self-interested way 
depends on whether it is held in a personal or fiduciary capacity. This in turn depends on the 
settlor’s intention, discoverable by examination of his words and the context in which they 
were expressed. If the settlor intended that the power-holder should be able to exercise the 
power to benefit himself then he can do that;27 if the settlor intended that the power-holder 
should exercise it exclusively in the interests of the beneficiaries then he cannot validly 
exercise it in his own interest where this differs from the beneficiaries’ interest.28  
The rules governing the question whether a power may be released also turn on the 
question whether the power is held in a fiduciary capacity. This is so despite the wide 
wording of the Law of Property Act 1925, s 155, which states that: 
 
A person to whom any power, whether coupled with an interest or not, is given may 
by deed release, or contract not to exercise, the power. 
 
This rule holds good where the power has been given to a power-holder in a personal 
capacity: consistently with the rule which says that such a power-holder need not even 
consider whether to exercise the power,29 he is free to release the power if he wishes and the 
                                                     
27 Re Ryder [1914] 1 Ch 865; C v C (Ancillary Relief: Trust Fund) [2009] EWHC 1491 (Fam); [2010] 1 FLR 
337 [15], [19]. 
28 Re Skeats’ Settlement (1889) 42 Ch D 522; Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas plc [2014] EWCA Civ 640; 
[2014] Bus LR 835 [119]: ‘the exercise of a fiduciary power for reasons which are even in part based on the 
trustee’s self-interest will be voidable, even if the trustee was actuated by other legitimate considerations’. 
29 Re Park [1932] 1 Ch 580, 582. 
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effect of doing so is to destroy the power.30 However, where the power has been given to him 
in a fiduciary capacity, the power-holder must consider whether to exercise it from time to 
time,31 and so he cannot release it unless release is authorised by the terms of the trust.32 
 In Re Wills’ Trust Deeds Buckley J distinguished cases where the settlor confers a 
power to benefit the power-holder, who can therefore exercise it as he chooses, or not at all, 
from cases where the settlor means to constitute the power-holder as his ‘mandatory’ 
(meaning his agent), where the power-holder is subject to constraints. In the latter case, if:33 
 
the power is granted as a means of achieving an end which the settlor desires but 
which involves making a selection or decision which at the time of the creation of the 
trust the settlor feels unable to make, or of a kind which the settlor considers the 
donee to be better qualified to make than he himself is, then the proper inference may 
be that the settlor confers the power on the donee because he reposes a confidence in 
him to perform vicariously on his, the settlor’s, behalf a function which the settlor 
would himself perform were it not that the circumstances are, or may turn out to be, 
such that he is bound to entrust its performance to someone else, or that they are such 
that he chooses to entrust it to the donee because of his peculiar qualifications to 
perform it. … [Whereas] in respect of what I have called beneficial powers the donee 
is unlikely to be under any obligation to the settlor, either legal or moral, to exercise 
such a power, and so could not be regarded as acting unconscientiously in debarring 
                                                     
30 Smith v Houblon (1859) 26 Beav 482; 53 ER 984; Re Hancock [1896] 2 Ch 173, 183, approving Sir G 
Farwell, A Concise Treatise on Powers, 2nd edn (London, Stevens & Sons, 1893) 15; Re Gestetner Settlement 
[1953] Ch 672, 687. 
31 Re Gulbenkian [1970] AC 508, 518; Re Baden’s Deed Trusts [1971] AC 424, 456. 
32 Re Mills [1930] 1 Ch 654, 661; Muir v IRC [1966] 1 WLR 1269, 1283. 
33 [1964] Ch 219, 228–29. 
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himself from its use, in the case of what I have called a vicarious power the donee, 
even if under no legal or moral obligation to exercise the power, ought not in good 
conscience to deprive himself of the capacity to exercise it until the period within 
which it must be exercised, if at all, has run out … 
 
 When the donee of a power exercises it to create new rights and duties under a trust, 
and the trustees act in accordance with these new rights and duties, no question arises of the 
trustees committing a breach of the duties which they previously owed but no longer owe 
following the donee’s exercise of the power. This is consistent with the settlor’s and trustees’ 
intentions when the trust was created, on terms which authorised future variations; nor can 
the beneficiaries complain if their rights are altered or destroyed in this way since these rights 
were always inherently amenable to authorised alteration or destruction. As Barrett JA said in 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal, in Re Dion Investments Pty Ltd:34 
 
Where the trust instrument contains a provision allowing variation by a particular 
process, the situation is one in which the settlor, in declaring the trust and defining its 
terms, has specified that those terms are not immutable and that the original terms will 
be superseded by varied terms if the specified process of variation (entailing, in 
concept, a power of appointment or a power of revocation or both) is undertaken. The 
varied terms are in that way traceable to the settlor’s intention as communicated to the 
original trustee. 
 
 
3. ACTIONS BY THE SETTLOR 
                                                     
34 [2014] NSWCA 367; (2014) 87 NSWLR 753 [45]. 
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Once a trust is up and running the settlor has no power to create new rights and duties under 
it unless he expressly reserved such a power to himself at the time when the trust was created. 
As Cory J held in the Supreme Court of Canada, in Air Products Canada v Schmidt:35 
 
The settlor of a trust can reserve any power to itself that it wishes provided the 
reservation is made at the time the trust is created. A settlor may choose to maintain 
the right to appoint trustees, to change the beneficiaries of the trust, or to withdraw the 
trust property. Generally, however, the transfer of the trust property to the trustee is 
absolute. Any power of control of that property will be lost unless the transfer is 
expressly made subject to it. 
 
If a settlor has no reserved powers and he directs trustees to exercise a discretionary 
power in a certain way and they act in accordance with his instructions without using their 
own independent judgment, their acts can be set aside.36 If a settlor has no reserved powers 
and he directs trustees to apply the trust property in a manner that is not authorised by the 
trust deed, and they obey his instructions, one of two possible conclusions may be drawn. 
Either the trustees commit a breach of trust, or the trust deed is a sham, and does not 
accurately record the arrangement which the settlor and trustee made at the outset regarding 
the property. 
                                                     
35 [1994] 2 SCR 611, 643. 
36 Turner v Turner [1984] Ch 100. 
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The settlor and the trustee must have had a common intention to deceive before the 
sham doctrine will apply. As Rimer J held in in Shalson v Russo:37 
 
When a settlor creates a settlement he purports to divest himself of assets in favour of 
the trustee, and the trustee accepts them on the basis of the trusts of the settlement. 
The settlor may have an unspoken intention that the assets are in fact to be treated as 
his own and that the trustee will accede to his every request on demand. But unless 
that intention is from the outset shared by the trustee (or later becomes so shared), 
I fail to see how the settlement can be regarded as a sham. 
 
Where the settlor and trustee share a common intention to deceive, the rights and 
duties specified in the trust deed never come into existence and instead the property is held 
from the outset in accordance with some other arrangement agreed by the settlor and trustee. 
The parenthesised words in the foregoing passage of Rimer J’s judgment suggest that rights 
and duties recorded in a trust deed can come into existence, but can be altered or extinguished 
if the settlor and trustee later form a different common intention respecting what should 
happen to the trust property. As Justice David Hayton has observed, however, in extra-
judicial writing endorsed by His Honour Judge Weeks QC in Hill v Spread Trustee Co Ltd,38 
there can be no ‘halfway house’: a trust deed cannot accurately record the settlor’s initial 
intention to create a trust, but afterwards become a sham document if the settlor changes his 
mind and agrees with the trustee that the trustee will do something else with the property.39 
                                                     
37 [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281, 342. See too Hitch v Stone [2001] EWCA Civ 63; [2001] STC 214 
[69]; Re Esteem Settlement [2003] JRC 092; 2003 JLR 188 [53]; A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam); [2007] 2 FLR 
467 [34]. 
38 [2005] EWHC 336 (Ch); [2005] BPIR 842. 
39 D Hayton, ‘Shams, Piercing Veils, Remedial Constructive Trusts and Tracing’ (2004) 8 Jersey LR 1, 8. 
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Once a trust has been created it cannot be revoked by the settlor, even with the trustee’s 
agreement, unless the settlor has a reserved power of revocation.40 Unless the settlor is a 
beneficiary of the trust he has no standing to enforce its terms against the trustee,41 and a 
fortiori he cannot validly direct the trustee to commit an act that is unauthorised by the terms 
of the trust deed. 
It follows that the true position in relation to shams is as Munby J stated in A v A:42 
 
[As] a matter of principle a trust which is not initially a sham cannot subsequently 
become a sham. … Once a trust has been properly constituted, typically by the 
vesting of the trust property in the trustee(s) and by the execution of the deed setting 
out the trusts upon which the trust property is to be held by the trustee(s), the property 
cannot lose its character as trust property save in accordance with the terms of the 
trust itself, for example, by being paid to or applied for the benefit of a beneficiary in 
accordance with the terms of the trust deed. Any other application of the trust 
property is simply and necessarily a breach of trust; nothing less and nothing more. 
                                                     
40 Lindsay J described this as an ‘elementary proposition’ in Dhingra v Dhingra (1999) 2 ITELR 262, 265. See 
also Naas v Westminster Bank Ltd [1940] AC 366, 389. 
41 Barclays Bank Ltd v Attorney General [1944] AC 372, 380. 
42 A v A (n 37) [42]–[43]. See too Re Reynolds [2008] NZCA 122; [2008] 3 NZLR 45 [57]; Lewis v Condon 
[2013] NSWCA 204; (2013) 85 NSWLR 99 [80]–[82]. In A v A Munby J added at [44] that ‘The only way … in 
which a properly constituted trust which is not, ab initio, a sham could conceivably become a sham 
subsequently would be if all the beneficiaries were, with the requisite intention, to join together for that purpose 
with the trustees’. However, this would not only require that the trustees and beneficiaries must have agreed that 
the terms of the trust should be changed (as discussed in Section 6 below), but also that they must have agreed 
to conceal this change from others. 
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A trustee who has bona fide accepted office as such cannot divest himself of 
his fiduciary obligations by his own improper acts. If therefore, a trustee who has 
entered into his responsibilities, and without having any intention of being party to a 
sham, subsequently purports, perhaps in agreement with the settlor, to treat the trust 
as a sham, the effect is not to create a sham where previously there was a valid trust. 
The only effect, even if the agreement is actually carried into execution, is to expose 
the trustee to a claim for breach of trust and, it may well be, to expose the settlor to a 
claim for knowing assistance in that breach of trust. 
 
 The same points were also made by Barrett JA in Re Dion Investments Pty Ltd:43 
 
Where an express trust is established … by a deed made between a settlor and the 
initial trustee to which the settled property is transferred, rights of the beneficiaries 
arise immediately the deed takes effect. The beneficiaries are not parties to the deed 
and, to the extent that it embodies covenants given by its parties to one another, the 
beneficiaries are strangers to those covenants and cannot sue at law for breach of 
them. The beneficiaries’ rights are equitable rights arising from the circumstance that 
the trustee has accepted the office of trustee and, therefore, the duties and obligations 
with respect to the trust property (and otherwise) that that office carries with it. 
Any subsequent action of the settlor and the original trustee to vary the 
provisions of the deed made by them will not be effective to affect either the rights 
and interests of the beneficiaries or the duties, obligations and powers of the trustee. 
Those two parties have no ability to deprive the beneficiaries of those rights and 
interests or to vary either the terms of the trust that the trustee is bound to execute and 
                                                     
43 Dion (n 34) [41]–[43]. 
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uphold or the powers that are available to the trustee in order to do so. The terms of 
the trust have, in the eyes of equity, an existence that is independent of the provisions 
of the deed that define them. 
Let it be assumed that on Monday the settlor and the trustee execute and 
deliver the trust deed (at which point the settled sum changes hands) and that on 
Tuesday they execute a deed revoking the original deed and stating that their rights 
and obligations are as if it had never existed. Unless some power of revocation of the 
trusts has been reserved, the subsequent action does not change the fact that the 
trustee holds the settled sum for the benefit of beneficiaries named in the original 
deed and upon the trusts stated in that deed. The … equitable rights and interests of a 
beneficiary cannot be taken away or varied by anyone unless the terms of the trust 
itself (or statute) so allow. 
 
4. ACTIONS BY THE TRUSTEES 
 
As the foregoing passages of Munby J’s and Barrett JA’s judgments indicate, trustees are 
prima facie in the same position as the settlor once the trust is up and running: they cannot 
unilaterally create new rights and duties under the trust unless the settlor gave them a power 
to do this at the time when the trust was created. They are bound to observe the limits on their 
authority,44 and in particular they may not enter unauthorised transactions affecting the trust 
property or make unauthorised appointments of the trust property.45  
                                                     
44 Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 212 CLR 484 [32]: ‘Perhaps the most important 
duty of a trustee is to obey the terms of the trust’. 
45 Re Hay’s Settlement Trusts [1982] 1 WLR 202, 210; AIB (n 12) [51]. 
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Situations may arise, however, where trustees believe that it would be in the 
beneficiaries’ best interests to enter an unauthorised transaction – in Lord Lindley’s phrase, 
where trustees wish to commit what they believe to be a ‘judicious breach of trust’.46 It may 
be, for example, that a limit on their investment powers prevents the trustees from managing 
the trust fund in what they believe would produce the best financial return for the 
beneficiaries.47 Where they cannot obtain the beneficiaries’ consent, the question arises 
whether there is anything else that they can do? 
 Three possibilities are worth mentioning. First, the trustees might be protected by an 
exemption clause if the clause covers deliberate breaches of duty done in good faith and the 
reasonable belief that the beneficiaries will benefit from them.48 Whether a court would find 
that the trustees were protected in such a case might be an uncertain matter, however. 
Second, the court might relieve the trustees from liability after (but not before49) they have 
performed their unauthorised action under the Trustee Act 1925, s 61. Again, though, the 
exercise of the court’s power to relieve the trustees under the section is unpredictable because 
                                                     
46 Perrins v Bellamy [1899] 1 Ch 797, 798 (Lindley MR): ‘My old master, the late Lord Justice Selwyn, used to 
say, “The main duty of a trustee is to commit judicious breaches of trust”’; amended in National Trustees Co of 
Australasia Ltd v General Finance Co of Australasia Ltd [1905] AC 373, 375–76 (Lord Lindley): ‘The words 
“main duty” are a mistake. They ought to be “great use”’. See also Lewis v Lynch (CA, 13 March 1980). 
47 A common event prior to the Trustee Act 2000 reforms of trustee investment powers:  J Holmes and P Milner, 
‘Trust Law Reforms: Are We Nearly There Yet?’ [2000] PCB 114, 119. See also Target (n 12) 433 (Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson): it ‘often occurs’ that ‘a trustee commits a judicious breach of trust by investing in an 
unauthorised investment’. 
48 Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241, 250–51; Walker v Stones [2001] QB 902, 935, 939–41. 
49 Perrins v Bellamy [1898] 2 Ch 521, 527; Re Rosenthal [1972] 1 WLR 1273, 1277–78. 
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everything turns on the facts.50 The third and safest course for the trustees would therefore be 
to make an application for prior approval from the court under the Trustee Act 1925, s 57.51 
This section applies where trustees lack the power under the trust deed and the general law to 
enter transactions in the course of managing and administering the trust property which the 
court accepts to be expedient, and it authorises the court to make an order conferring the 
necessary power on the trustees, either generally or in a particular instance.52  
Where trustees successfully take one of these three routes to perform unauthorised 
acts without incurring liability, the question arises whether the exemption clause or the court 
order changes the duties that the trustees would otherwise owe, or merely exempts them from 
liability for breach of their duties? So far as exemption clauses are concerned, the answer 
depends on their wording. Many clauses exclude liability for breach of trustee duties without 
changing the content of the duties, but clauses can also be drafted to achieve the latter effect. 
An example is provided by Hayim v Citibank NA,53 where Citibank was appointed executor 
                                                     
50 For cases where trustees have been relieved of liability for unauthorised acts, see Perrins v Bellamy [1898] 2 
Ch 521, affirmed [1899] 1 Ch 797; Re Allsop [1914] 1 Ch 1. For cases where they have not, see Santander UK v 
RA Legal Solicitors [2014] EWCA Civ 183; [2014] PNLR 420; AIB (n 12). 
51 Recommended in eg S Laing, ‘To Whom Do the Accumulations under an A & M Trust Belong? The Impact 
of Section 31 of the Trustee Act 1925’ [1998] PCB 323, 330; R Williams and I Lambert, ‘Exemption Clauses 
under Scrutiny’ [1999] PCB 87, 93; R Wilson, ‘How Safe Is a “Judicious Breach of Trust”?’ (2010) 121 TELTJ 
9. 
52 Section 57 puts into statutory form a power which formerly devolved on the courts as part of their inherent 
jurisdiction: the leading case before 1925 was Re New [1901] 2 Ch 534, approved in Chapman v Chapman 
[1954] AC 429. The courts continue to exercise their non-statutory inherent jurisdiction to sanction transactions 
which are authorised by the trust deed but objected to by the beneficiaries, as in eg Cotton v Earl of Cardigan 
[2014] EWCA Civ 1312; [2015] WTLR 39. 
53 [1987] AC 730. See also Citibank NA v MBIA Assurance SA [2007] EWCA Civ 11; [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 
475, discussed in Philip Sales’ chapter in the present volume. 
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of a testator’s American will on terms that it ‘shall have no responsibility or duty with respect 
to’ a Hong Kong house until the deaths of the testator’s elderly brother and sister who resided 
in the house. This house was given by a Hong Kong will to another executor on trust for 
Citibank as executor of the American will. Citibank declined to take steps to have the house 
sold for the benefit of the beneficiaries under the American will who wanted the house to be 
sold and the siblings to be evicted from it. Substantial losses flowed from the delayed sale of 
the house, but the Privy Council held that the clause enabled Citibank to permit the siblings 
to remain living in the house without incurring any liability for losses because it owed no 
duties regarding the house (other than a duty not to use it for Citibank’s own purposes). 
The wording of the Trustee Act 1925, s 61 makes it clear that the section authorises 
the court to excuse a trustee from liability for breach of trust but does not negate the trustee’s 
duty.54 It follows that court orders relieving trustees from liability under the section do not 
change the content of the trustees’ duties and the beneficiaries’ corresponding rights against 
them. In contrast, the Trustee Act 1925, s 57 authorises the court to change the scope and 
content of the trustees’ powers and hence of the trustees’ duties and the beneficiaries’ rights. 
In Chapman v Chapman,55 the House of Lords held that the object of the section is to make it 
possible for trust property to be managed as advantageously as possible for the beneficiaries, 
but that it does not empower the court to alter the beneficial interests under trusts – a finding 
which led to the enactment of the Variation of Trusts Act 1958 because Parliament 
considered that the courts should be able to sanction such alterations in cases where the 
beneficiaries could not do it for themselves because they were not all sui juris and owners of 
the entire beneficial interest.56 However the courts have also held that the partitioning and 
                                                     
54 MCP Pension Trustees Ltd v AON Pension Trustees Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 377; [2012] Ch 1 [18]. 
55 [1954] AC 249, affirming [1953] Ch 218, 248.  
56 Discussed in Section 5. 
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sale of trust property in the interest of good administration and management may be 
sanctioned under s 57 even though the result of this is to vary the beneficiaries’ interests, 
provided that this is only an ‘incidental’ effect of the court’s order.57 This rule leaves them 
with the difficult task of deciding when a variation of the beneficial interests is merely 
‘incidental’. For present purposes the significance of this rule is that trustees can sometimes 
win orders whose effect is to alter the beneficiaries’ rights in the trust property even if the 
beneficiaries themselves have not all consented to this.  
 
5. ACTIONS BY THE BENEFICIARIES 
 
The rule in Saunders v Vautier permits beneficiaries to terminate trusts and call for the 
transfer of legal title to the trust property if they are all sui juris and in agreement and owners 
of the entire beneficial interest.58 Whether the rule also permits such beneficiaries to create 
new rights and duties under existing trusts is another matter.  
Joel Nitikman has argued that it does.59 He contends that if one ignores the tax 
consequences as irrelevant to the trust analysis, there is no difference in principle between a 
case where the beneficiaries wish to end the trust, take the property and create a new trust 
(something which they are clearly able to do) and a case where the beneficiaries wish to keep 
the trust on foot and create new rights and duties under it. He derives support for this 
proposition from the many cases which hold that the Variation of Trusts Act 1958 and 
equivalent Commonwealth legislation are underpinned by the rule in Saunders v Vautier, 
                                                     
57 Re Z Trust [2011] WTLR 735; Sutton v England [2011] EWCA Civ 637; [2012] 1 WLR 326; Dion (n 34). 
58 The rule is named for Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115; 49 ER 282, although the principle is older. The 
definitive account is P Matthews, ‘The Comparative Importance of the Rule in Saunders v Vautier’ (2006) 112 
LQR 266. 
59 J Nitikman, ‘Variation under the Rule in Saunders v Vautier: Yes or No?’ (2015) 21 T&T 923. 
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insofar as they empower the court to supply the consent of beneficiaries who cannot consent 
for themselves (eg because they are not yet born), and which hold that this is the only thing 
needed for the variation to take effect when taken in combination with the consent of all the 
sui juris beneficiaries who can (and must60) speak for themselves.  
Thus, for example, Nitikman instances Goulding v James, where Mummery LJ 
extracted the following propositions from the authorities:61 
   
First, what varies the trust is not the court, but the agreement or consensus of the 
beneficiaries. Secondly, there is no real difference in principle in the rearrangement of 
the trusts between the case where the court is exercising its jurisdiction on behalf of 
the specified class under the 1958 Act and the case where the resettlement is made by 
virtue of the doctrine in Saunders v Vautier … and by all the adult beneficiaries 
joining together. Thirdly, the court is merely contributing on behalf of infants and 
unborn and unascertained persons the binding assents to the arrangement which they, 
unlike an adult beneficiary, cannot give. The 1958 Act has thus been viewed by the 
courts as a statutory extension of the consent principle embodied in the rule in 
Saunders v Vautier. The principle recognises the rights of beneficiaries, who are sui 
juris and together absolutely entitled to the trust property, to exercise their proprietary 
rights to overbear and defeat the intention of a testator or settlor to subject property to 
the continuing trusts, powers and limitations of a will or trust instrument. 
                                                     
60 The court cannot supply the missing consent of sui juris beneficiaries: Knocker v Youle [1986] 1 WLR 934. 
But note the mechanism devised to circumvent this problem in A v B [2016] EWHC 340 (Ch). 
61 [1997] 2 All ER 239, 247. See too IRC v Holmden [1968] AC 685, 701, 710–11, 713; Re Holt’s Settlement 
[1969] 1 Ch 100, 120; Muhling v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2001] WASC 225 [25]–[26]; Sutherland v 
Hudson’s Bay Co (2005) 74 OR (3d) 608; Re IMK Family Trust [2008] JRC 136; [2009] 1 FLR 664; Wright v 
Gater [2011] EWHC 2881 (Ch) [11]; Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Barns [2012] VSCA 77 [27]. 
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The role of the court is not to stand in as, or for, a settlor in varying the trusts. 
[Rather] … the court acts “on behalf of” the specified class and, in appropriate cases, 
supplies consent for persons incapable of consenting. 
 
The opposing view, that the rule in Saunders v Vautier does not empower 
beneficiaries to create new rights and duties under existing trusts, has been taken by Donovan 
Waters,62 whose reasons centre on the principle established by Re Brockbank.63 It was held 
there that beneficiaries could not force one of two trustees, in whom a power to appoint new 
trustees was vested, to concur in the appointment of a new trustee which was demanded by 
the other trustee and all the beneficiaries, although these beneficiaries were sui juris and 
together entitled to the whole beneficial interest. This finding was later endorsed by Walton J 
in Stephenson v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd, who said that beneficiaries cannot ‘at one and 
the same time override the pre-existing trusts and keep them in existence’, and who thought 
that it also followed that ‘the beneficial interest holders [are not] entitled to direct the trustees 
as to the particular investment they should make of the trust fund’.64  
 
6. BENEFICIARIES AND TRUSTEES ACTING TOGETHER 
                                                     
62 D Waters, ‘Does the Rule in Saunders v Vautier Include the Power of Beneficiaries to Vary the Terms of the 
Trust?’ (2014) 33 Estates, Trusts & Pensions Journal 78. See also Lewin (n 8) [24.024]–[24.026]; Underhill (n 
8) [66.27]–[66.30].  
63 [1948] Ch 206. 
64 [1975] 1 All ER 625, 637. See too Napier v Light (1974) 236 EG 273, 278; Holding & Management Ltd v 
Property Holding and Investment Trust plc [1989] 1 WLR 1313, 1324; Ingram v IRC [1997] 4 All ER 395, 424; 
Hotung v Ho Yuen Ki [2002] 3 HKLRD 641; Harb v Harb [2010] NSWSC 1251 [13]; Hancock v Rinehart 
[2015] NSWSC 646 [161]–[162]; Pettigrew v Edwards [2017] EWHC 8 (Ch) [45].  
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The fact that creating new rights and duties under an existing trust would be contrary to the 
settlor’s wishes does not suffice to justify a rule forbidding beneficiaries to do this, given that 
termination of the trust is permitted although this would run counter to the settlor’s wishes. 
However, the courts have held that the wishes of the trustees must also be taken into account: 
the trustees only agree to take office on the basis that they will have a particular set of 
discretionary powers and duties owed to a particular set of beneficiaries, and so it would be 
unfair to them if the beneficiaries could rewrite the terms of the ‘deal’ which the trustees 
made with the settlor, regardless of whether the trustees themselves agreed to this. This was 
also brought out by Walton J in Stephenson, where he said that:65 
 
[O]nce the beneficial interest holders have determined to end the trust they are not 
entitled, unless by agreement, to the further services of the trustees. Those trustees 
can of course be compelled to hand over the entire trust assets to any person or 
persons selected by the beneficiaries against a proper discharge, but they cannot be 
compelled, unless they are in fact willing to comply with the directions, to do 
anything else with the trust fund which they are not in fact willing to do. 
  
This suggests that the difference of opinion described in the previous section can be 
resolved if we distinguish between acts done by beneficiaries acting unilaterally without the 
trustees’ agreement and acts done by beneficiaries with the trustees’ agreement. The rule in 
Saunders v Vautier permits beneficiaries to override the wishes of the settlor and terminate 
                                                     
65 Stephenson (n 64) 637. See too Tempest v Lord Camoys (1882) 21 Ch D 571, 578 (Jessel MR): ‘It is settled 
law that when a testator has given a pure discretion to trustees as to the exercise of a power, the court does not 
enforce the exercise of the power against the wish of the trustees’. 
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the trusts and they do not need the trustees to agree to this because the trustees will have no 
further duties to perform once the trust has been ended.66 However, the rule does not entitle 
the beneficiaries to require the trustees to keep the trust going on different terms, or to serve 
as the trustees of a new trust declared by the beneficiaries,67 because although it empowers 
the beneficiaries to override the wishes of the settlor it does not empower them to force new 
duties onto the trustees which the trustees do not wish to perform and did not agree to 
perform when they took office. 
This understanding of the law is supported by judicial statements which envisage that 
the beneficiaries can change the terms of existing trusts, or declare new trusts which will be 
operated by their existing trustees, provided that the trustees consent to this arrangement. 
This principle is sometimes said to be grounded in the rule in Saunders v Vautier, but it 
would be more accurate to say that it is an extension of the rule, which depends on the 
trustees’ consent as well as the beneficiaries’ consent to the new arrangement. 
For example, Lord Wilberforce said in IRC v Holmden that:68 
 
                                                     
66 Cf JW Harris, ‘Trust, Power and Duty’ (1971) 87 LQR 31, 63: ‘[b]y breaking up the trust, the beneficiaries do 
not compel the trustees to carry out any part of their office as active trustees; on the contrary, they bring that 
office to an end’. 
67 If these are different, as to which note Lord Wilberforce’s comments in Holmden (n 61) 713, and Megarry J’s 
findings in Holt (n 62) both discussed in P Luxton, ‘Variation of Trusts: Settlors’ Intentions and the Consent 
Principle in Saunders v Vautier’ (1997) 60 MLR 719, 721–22, concluding that ‘an arrangement approved under 
the [1958] Act has the same effect as a variation by sui juris beneficiaries under Saunders v Vautier’ and that ‘a 
variation under the Act … gives rise to new trusts replacing the old’. 
68 Holmden (n 61) 713 (emphasis added). See also Re Chrimes [1917] 1 Ch 30; Timpson’s Executors v Yerbury 
[1936] 1 KB 645, 664; Grey v IRC [1960] AC 1; Westpac Banking Corp v Bell Group Ltd (No 3) [2012] 
WASCA 157 [2495]: beneficiaries can declare new trusts of the trust property ‘with the consent of the trustee’. 
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If all the beneficiaries under [a] settlement [are] sui juris, they [can join] together with 
the trustees and [declare] different trusts which would supersede those originally 
contained in the settlement. 
 
Likewise in Re Dion Investments Pty Ltd, Barrett JA said that:69 
 
Under the principle in Saunders v Vautier … beneficiaries … are entitled to put an 
end to the trust and to require that the trust property be transferred to them. Their 
capacity to produce that result also enables them to require, as an alternative, that the 
property be held by the trustee upon varied trusts; but, if they do so require, the 
situation may in truth be one of resettlement upon new trusts rather than variation of 
the pre-existing trusts (and the trustee may not be compellable to accept and perform 
those new trusts). 
 
Law reform bodies around the Commonwealth have made the same point. Thus, the 
Scottish Law Commission has argued that:70 
 
[I]f a beneficiary has a right to direct that trust assets be made over to him absolutely, 
it must follow that this right extends to directing that these assets be made over to a 
third party (such as new trustees) or, provided that the trustees are willing to continue 
to act as such, that the assets be held by them for new or amended purposes. 
 
                                                     
69 Dion (n 34) [46] (emphasis added). 
70 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Variation and Termination of Trusts (Scot Law Com No 206, 2007) 
para 2.6 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, the New Zealand Law Commission has recommended codifying legislation to 
make it clear that in their jurisdiction the rule in Saunders v Vautier empowers legally 
capable adult beneficiaries to effect a resettlement of a trust, as well as a variation or 
revocation, and that:71 
 
The agreement of the trustee will always be required in cases where the original trusts 
continue, to avoid the trustees being burdened by obligations to which they may not 
have agreed. 
 
In this respect the position of the beneficiaries is analogous to the position of a settlor 
who wishes to create an express trust for the first time. A settlor can express the wish that 
certain parties should act as the trustees and hold the trust property subject to certain duties, 
and if the nominated parties agree these duties will become enforceable and the beneficiaries 
will have corresponding rights against them in their capacity as trustees of the settlement. 
However, the nominated parties can refuse to accept these duties: they can disclaim and the 
settlor or court must then find other people who are willing to accept the trusteeship. In just 
the same way, the beneficiaries of an existing trust can express the wish that the trustees 
should become subject to new duties, either under a varied trust or under a new settlement, 
and if the trustees agree then new rights and duties will be created.72 But the trustees can 
                                                     
71 New Zealand Law Commission, Review of the Law of Trusts: A Trusts Act for New Zealand (NZLC R130, 
2013) para 10.6. See also para 10.3, where they cite Re Philips New Zealand Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 93, 101 for the 
proposition that the law of New Zealand already permits beneficiaries ‘to use the rule to confer new powers 
upon trustees or deviate from, or vary, the terms of the trust where the trustees are in agreement with the 
change’. See now New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Draft Trusts Bill (2016), s 109, especially s 109(2)(d).. 
72 As stated in n 66, a ‘varied trust’ may be functionally identical with a ‘new settlement’. However, different 
formality rules may apply, depending on the mechanism by means of which the beneficiaries and trustees agree 
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decline to act on these new terms, and if the beneficiaries insist on the new or varied terms 
then either the trustees may choose to retire or the beneficiaries can force them to retire and 
appoint more compliant trustees under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 
1996, s 19. 
  Further support for the view that new rights and duties under existing trusts can be 
created by trustees and beneficiaries acting together can be drawn from a long line of cases 
which hold that where trustees wrongfully sell trust property or buy new property with trust 
money, the beneficiaries can adopt the sale or purchase. The sale proceeds or the new asset 
are then treated as having been acquired by the trustees in an authorised transaction and form 
part of the trust fund thereafter, to be held by the trustees in accordance with the trust terms. 
Cases to this effect include Wright v Morgan, where Viscount Dunedin held that:73 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to effect the new arrangement. A variation authorised under the 1958 Act is not caught by the Law of Property 
Act 1925, s 53(1)(c) (which requires signed writing for ‘dispositions’ of equitable interests): Holt (n 61) 115. 
Nor can the sub-section be engaged if the beneficiaries take a conveyance of legal title to themselves (since it 
concerns dispositions of ‘equitable’ and not ‘legal’ interests) and then transfer this legal title to the trustees of a 
new settlement. This consideration seems to have led the judges in Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291 to hold 
that s 53(1)(c) is not engaged where an absolute beneficial owner directs his trustee to transfer legal title to 
another person with the intention that his equitable interest shall thereby be extinguished. This finding should 
also logically extend to a case where the recipient of the legal title has previously agreed to hold it on a new 
trust. However, these were effectively the facts of Grey (n 71), which held that such an arrangement is caught by 
s 53(1)(c), although it is hard to see this because in Grey the trustees effectively ‘conveyed’ legal title from 
themselves in their capacity as trustees for the settlor to themselves in their different capacity as trustees of other 
pre-existing settlements for the settlor’s grandchildren. This is well explained in B Green, ‘Grey, Oughtred and 
Vandervell – A Contextual Reappraisal’ (1984) 47 MLR 385, especially at 389–90, 408–11.  
73 [1926] AC 788, 799, adding that ‘if there is not unanimity then it is not trust property, but the trustee who has 
made it must keep the investment himself. He is debtor to the trust for the money which has been applied in its 
purchase’. See also Harrison v Harrison (1740) 2 Atk 121; 26 ER 476; Bostock v Blakeney (1794) 2 Bro CC 
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if a trustee has made an improper investment, the law is well settled. The cestuis que 
trustent as a whole have a right, if they chose, to adopt the investment and to hold it as 
trust property. 
 
Likewise, in Libertarian Investments Ltd v Hall, Lord Millett NPJ said that if an account of a 
trustee’s dealings with trust property discloses an unauthorised disbursement:74 
 
the [beneficiary] may falsify it, that is to say ask for the disbursement to be 
disallowed. … But [he] is not bound to ask for the disbursement to be disallowed. He 
is entitled to ask for an inquiry to discover what the [trustee] did with the trust money 
… [and if he] invested the money at a profit, the [beneficiary] … can treat it as an 
authorised disbursement, treat the property in which it has been invested as acquired 
with trust money, and follow or trace the property and demand that it or its traceable 
proceeds be restored to the trust in specie. 
  
 The trustees’ unauthorised dealings with the trust property may precede the giving of 
the beneficiaries’ consent, or they may not, since the trustees and beneficiaries may all agree 
in advance that the trustees will make the relevant sales and investments. Cases of the latter 
sort more obviously resemble cases where the trustees agree to take on new duties at the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
653, 656; 29 ER 362, 364; Pocock v Reddington (1801) 5 Ves Jun 794, 800; 31 ER 862, 865; Scott v Scott 
(1963) 109 CLR 649, 660. 
74 (2013) 16 HKCFAR 681 [168]–[169]. Other recent statements of the principle can be found in Ultraframe 
(UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) [1513]; Sinclair Investment Holdings SA v Versailles Trade 
Finance Ltd (in Administrative Receivership) [2007] EWHC 915 (Ch) [113]; Independent Trustee Services Ltd v 
GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195; [2013] Ch 91 [102]; Tang v Tang [2017] HKCFA 3 [23]–[25]. 
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beneficiaries’ request, but cases where the beneficiaries give their consent after the trustees’ 
dealings are essentially no different from cases where they consent to these dealings 
beforehand. In either case, the trustees’ motives for entering the relevant transaction do not 
matter, in the sense that it makes no difference whether they deal with the trust property with 
the subjective intention of acting for the beneficiaries, for themselves, or for someone else. 
All that matters is that the trustees have in fact sold the trust property or invested trust money 
in a transaction which is unauthorised by the trust deed but which the beneficiaries choose to 
adopt. This suggests that it may not be quite right to say that the sale proceeds or newly 
acquired investment become part of the trust fund because the beneficiaries and trustees have 
agreed that this should happen. In some cases there is no real agreement, and although the 
courts could deem an agreement to have taken place (for example, by refusing to let the 
trustees say that they acted with a contrary motive), there is no need for the courts to explain 
the cases in this way, since there is no need for an agreement at all: the beneficiaries and 
trustees need only to have ‘acted together’ in the sense that the trustees have in fact done 
something and the beneficiaries have consented to it. 
 In cases where beneficiaries adopt unauthorised sales or investments by trustees, 
some thought must also be given to the position of the third parties with whom the trustees 
have dealt. Unauthorised sales of trust property are not generally capable of overreaching the 
beneficiaries’ equitable interests in the property because overreaching only occurs as a result 
of the trustees’ exercise of their powers under the trust deed to subordinate the beneficiaries’ 
interests to those of a purchaser.75 Suppose, however, that a trustee sells trust property to a 
                                                     
75 State Bank of India v Sood [1997] Ch 276, 281 (Peter Gibson LJ), endorsing C Harpum, ‘Overreaching, 
Trustees’ Powers and the Reform of the 1925 Legislation’ [1990] CLJ 277, especially at 294–95. Note that the 
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, s 6 gives trustees of land ‘all the powers of an absolute 
owner’ in relation to the land when exercising their functions as trustees. 
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third party purchaser in an unauthorised transaction which the beneficiaries subsequently 
adopt. In such a case overreaching comes into play again because the beneficiaries’ adoption 
of the sale retroactively confers the necessary authority on the trustees to overreach their 
beneficial interest.76 Support for this can be drawn from Jessel MR’s statement in Re Hallett's 
Estate that the beneficiaries’ ability to treat the proceeds of an unauthorised sale as trust 
property is the same as for an authorised sale.77 Since the beneficiaries’ ability to do this is 
the corollary of the overreaching doctrine, it follows that the purchaser’s position is also the 
same in both cases. Jessel MR’s words were as follows: 
 
The modern doctrine of Equity as regards property disposed of by persons in a 
fiduciary position is a very clear and well-established doctrine. You can, if the sale 
was rightful, take the proceeds of the sale, if you can identify them. If the sale was 
wrongful, you can still take the proceeds of the sale, in a sense adopting the sale for 
the purpose of taking the proceeds, if you can identify them. There is no distinction, 
therefore, between a rightful and a wrongful disposition of the property, so far as 
regards the right of the beneficial owner to follow the proceeds. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
It may seem perverse to have written an account of the circumstances in which new rights 
and duties can be created under existing trusts for a collection of essays concerned with 
                                                     
76 D Fox, ‘Overreaching’ in Birks and Pretto (n 3) 106–07. See also RC Nolan, ‘Property in a Fund’ (2004) 120 
LQR 108, 111–16. 
77 (1880) 13 Ch D 696, 708–09. 
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‘Defences in Equity’. One point of our study, however, has been to show that legal rules can 
produce more than one effect, and that their significance for litigants may depend on the 
context in which they are invoked. It may suit trustees to defend a claim for breach of trust by 
arguing that they never committed a breach of duty because the effect of the beneficiaries’ 
unanimous consent to their actions was to change the content of the duties which the trustees 
owed. Or it may suit beneficiaries to say that they acquired new rights against trustees when 
they agreed with the trustees that the trust property should be held on different terms, or when 
they adopted the trustees’ unauthorised dealings with the trust property. 
 A wider point which emerges from our chapter is that rights and duties under express 
trusts are not only sourced in the intentions of settlors that they should come into existence. 
Settlors can only realise their intentions with the cooperation of other parties, such as their 
intended trustees and beneficiaries who must choose to accept (and not to disclaim) their 
duties and rights, and such as the intended donees of powers who must choose to exercise 
their powers, as discussed in this chapter in Section 2. The intentions of settlors can also be 
overridden, and new rights and duties can be created which the settlor may not have 
contemplated and may not have wished to be brought into existence. As discussed in Sections 
4 and 5, trustees and beneficiaries have limited ability to achieve such effects if they act 
unilaterally, but as discussed in Section 6, they have more power if they act together. 
